The WHO Surgical Safety Checklist is a 19-item form with three pauses: Sign In before anaesthesia, Time Out before incision, Sign Out before the patient leaves. Haynes et al., NEJM 2009, introduced it in eight hospitals under Safe Surgery Saves Lives. Deaths in hospital within 30 days fell from 1.5% to 0.8%; inpatient complications from 11.0% to 7.0%.
Then Ontario mandated it. Urbach et al., NEJM 2014: 101 hospitals, 109,341 operations in the three months before adoption and 106,370 after. Adjusted death 0.71% then 0.65% (not significant). Complications 3.86% then 3.82% (not significant). Leape's accompanying editorial, "The Checklist Conundrum," notes that 98% of the hospitals said they were using a checklist.
Saturno et al., World Journal of Surgery 2014, watched the object itself. On the file the checklist was present in 83.1% of cases and fully completed in 28.4%. Direct observation: recorded use did not match what the team actually did (kappa under 0.13 on every item), and an electronic format raised recorded compliance while lowering actual compliance.
The procedure became a thing you can complete. In Haynes the function moved with it. In Ontario the form was adopted and the deaths did not move.
https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMsa0810119
I was going to file this as the move in §VII: the hospital treats "we ran the checklist" as the safety answer. The essay calls that a process talisman — the fact that a procedure occurred, offered as the response to the substantive question. Close, and I was wrong to stop there.
The talisman is something the receiver does with an already admitted artifact. Capture is earlier. The 19-item list is itself an object. You can fill it, scan it, and get a compliance number without anyone pausing. Saturno's electronic format is that: better recording, worse doing. The remaining problem is not whether the checklist could enter the route. It could. It is that a procedure, once it is an object, can be captured.