The Department of Health was a buyer on paper. It had the budget, the contracts, and a Downing Street seminar in February 2002. What it did not have was a connected owner inside the organisations that actually had to live with the record.
The National Audit Office, 18 May 2011: the original aim — an electronic care record for every NHS patient under the Programme — "will not now be achieved." In the North, Midlands and East, four of 97 systems had been delivered to acute trusts in seven years. £2.7 billion spent on care records was not value for money; Amyas Morse had "no grounds for confidence" in the remaining £4.3 billion. London had more progress in some settings, and even there no GP practice was still receiving a system through the Programme; the number of planned acute-hospital systems had been halved. https://www.nao.org.uk/reports/the-national-programme-for-it-in-the-nhs-an-update-on-the-delivery-of-detailed-care-records-systems/
Margaret Hodge, for the Public Accounts Committee (3 August 2011): "Trying to create a one-size-fits-all system in the NHS was a massive risk and has proven to be unworkable." The Department could have avoided some of the waste "if they had consulted earlier with health professionals." https://www.parliament.uk/external/committees/committee-news-pre-oct-2020/2011/august/NHS-IT-report-/
Campion-Awwad, Hayton, Smith and Vuaran (Cambridge MPhil case history, February 2014) put the geometry in one sentence they take from Computer Weekly: large centralised IT schemes imposed on semi-autonomous NHS sites rarely work. The 1998 strategy had championed local ownership of electronic patient records. NPfIT squashed that. Trusts could, and did, decline. https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/archive/rja14/Papers/npfit-mpp-2014-case-history.pdf
That is not a hard sale that needed a better deck. The national object asked each trust to become the buyer of a record it did not own as a problem and could not authorise as a single actor. Founding that buyer by mandate still left the owner-authority path unconnected at the point of adoption.
Hold the FBI next to that, or the diagnosis swallows every failed procurement.
After 11 September 2001 the Bureau needed a case file its agents could search. Robert Mueller was the economic buyer. Science Applications International Corporation had the contract. The Justice Department Inspector General (Audit 05-07, February 2005) found that after more than three years and $170 million expected on Virtual Case File, the FBI still had no clear timetable for finishing it. Agents were still on Automated Case Support and paper. The delays were design changes after the mission shifted from ordinary crime to preventing terrorism, poor early management, inadequate oversight, and a lack of sound IT investment practice — not the absence of a seat that owned investigations and could sign. https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/legacy/reports/FBI/a0507/final.pdf
Mueller cancelled VCF in March 2005 and told the House it was his fault for not putting the right people on the contract (New York Times, 9 March 2005). Sentinel, the successor, eventually went live in 2012.
Same class of object as NPfIT from a distance: giant public software, late, over budget. Different cut on the essay's test. The FBI already had a connected owner-authority path for case management. The sale, such as it was, could close. The build failed. Relabel that as "no buyer" and you cannot tell a missing mandate from a botched contractor.